This paper formulates an empirical model to estimate the impact of endogenous new RTA membership on trade structure. The likelihood of new RTA membership is influenced by economic fundamentals such as country size, factor endowments and trade and investment costs. In a sample of country-pairs covering mainly the OECD economies we find a particularly strong effect of endogenous RTAs on intra-industry trade in a difference-in-difference analysis based on matching techniques. We identify an RTA-induced impact on the intra-industry trade share of about 40 percent of its average level. The associated trade volume effects are similar to previous research on trade volume effects of endogenous RTAs. Overall, this indicates that RTA membership might reduce inter-industry trade not only in relative but also in absolute terms and that the trade volume effect is due to the associated growth in trade within industries.
Non-Technical Summary
The voluminous literature on the consequences of regional trade agreements (RTAs) for welfare and trade is one of the central building blocks of research in international economics. While it is well understood theoretically under which conditions positive welfare effects of RTAs arise, empirical research has treated these agreements as exogenous for more than four decades. Implicitly, country-pairs have been viewed as being randomly assigned rather than self-selected into RTAs. Only recently have trade economists paid attention to their endogeneity when analyzing trade volume effects This line of research confirms that (i) RTAs foster bilateral trade on average when controlling for endogeneity and (ii) their exogenous treatment is not justified from an econometric viewpoint and leads to downward biased estimates of their impact on trade volumes.
However, it is not yet clear what the associated trade structure effects are. Do RTAs mainly stimulate gains from specialization as would be reflected in a growth of the share of interindustry trade? Or do they mainly foster gains associated with scale economies and product differentiation which would show up in a growth of the share of intra-industry trade? In the 1960s, a central issue was whether the formation of the European community between the late 1950s and mid 1960s would (driven by gains from inter-industry specialization) or would not (due to increased trade within industries) have important distributional consequences through the convergence of wages across countries and lead to an income loss of labour in the capitalabundant economies. Given that trade volumes tend to increase if country-pairs self-select into RTAs, what are the associated consequences for trade structure? It is this paper's purpose to study this question empirically.
To motivate our empirical analysis, we categorize the major factors steering the welfare effects of RTAs based on existing theoretical work. This forms the basis for an empirical model to estimate the likelihood of self-selecting into RTAs. Rather than analyzing the cross-sectional variation in RTA membership we focus on new RTA membership, which helps in avoiding bias from omitted time-invariant variables. Furthermore, we focus on the consequences of new RTA membership on the change in the bilateral intra-industry trade share rather than the volume of trade. And we consider the impact of new RTA membership within a narrowly defined time window around new membership to obtain unbiased estimates of the contemporaneous impact.
Introduction
The voluminous literature on the consequences of regional trade agreements (RTAs) for welfare and trade is one of the central building blocks of research in international economics.
While the conditions under which positive welfare effects of RTAs arise are well understood theoretically, empirical research has treated these agreements as exogenous for more than four decades. Implicitly, country-pairs have been viewed as being randomly assigned rather than self-selected into RTAs. Only recently have trade economists paid attention to their endogeneity when analyzing trade volume effects Bergstrand, 2002, 2006; Magee, 2003) . This line of research confirms that (i) RTAs foster bilateral trade on average when controlling for endogeneity and (ii) their exogenous treatment is not justified from an econometric viewpoint and leads to downward biased estimates of their impact on trade volumes.
However, it is not yet clear what the associated trade structure effects are. Do RTAs mainly stimulate gains from specialization as would be reflected in a growth of the share of interindustry trade? Or do they mainly foster gains associated with scale economies and product differentiation which would show up in a growth of the share of intra-industry trade? It is surprising that these questions have not yet surfaced in research on the trade effects of endogenous RTAs. In the 1960s, a central issue was whether the formation of the European community between the late 1950s and mid 1960s would (driven by gains from inter-industry specialization) or would not (due to increased trade within industries) have important distributional consequences through the convergence of wages across countries and lead to an income loss of labour in the capital-abundant economies Lloyd 1975 and Milner 1986) . 1 Given that trade volumes tend to increase if country-pairs selfselect into RTAs, what are the associated consequences for trade structure? It is this paper's purpose to study this question empirically.
To motivate our empirical analysis, we categorize the major factors steering the welfare effects of RTAs based on existing theoretical work. This forms the basis for an empirical model to estimate the likelihood of self-selecting into RTAs. Rather than analyzing the cross-sectional variation in RTA membership (Magee, 2003) we focus on new RTA membership, which helps in avoiding bias from omitted time-invariant variables. Furthermore, we focus on the consequences of new RTA membership on the change in the bilateral intra-industry trade share rather than the volume of trade. And we consider the impact of new RTA membership within a narrowly defined time window around new membership to obtain unbiased estimates of the contemporaneous impact.
Our empirical strategy rests on difference-in-difference matching techniques that are based on the idea of "selection on observables". As will become clear later, this approach is particularly suited for problems where it is hard to identify any outside instruments that are correlated with the treatment variable (in our case, new RTA membership) but uncorrelated with the outcome variable (the intra-industry trade share). For a sample of mainly OECD economies and RTA events since 1970, we estimate an endogenous treatment effect of new RTA membership on intra-industry trade shares that amounts to about four percent when using the preferable estimates. The share of intra-industry trade amounts to about eleven percent on average in the considered time span and country-sample. Hence, it increases by about 40 percent in response to new RTA membership. The effects on trade volumes are similar to the lagged treatment effects reported in Baier and Bergstrand (2006) , who use a larger sample of countries and a different empirical approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature on endogenous RTA formation and its consequences for trade. Section 3 lays out a detailed discussion of the problems and cures of self-selection in general with particular emphasis on matching. There, we also discuss our database and the specification of the estimated models. Sections 4 and 5 report on the major empirical findings and Section 6
provides an extensive discussion of their robustness. Section 7 concludes with a brief summary of the main findings.
Relationship to Existing Literature
The literature on RTAs is rooted in Viner's (1950) seminal work on trade creating and trade diverting effects of RTAs. Since then, the welfare effects associated with RTAs have formed a central block of interest in international economics. In particular, the recent wave of new RTA formation has led to a revival of academic research in this area (see Bagwell and Staiger, 3 1997; Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos, 2004) . Following Baier and Bergstrand (2004) , the welfare effects of trade liberalization are influenced by three categories of economic determinants: economic geography, inter-industry trade forces, and intra-industry trade forces.
First, the importance of economic geography factors was clearly articulated by Krugman (1991) and Wei (1995, 1996) . Trade diversion -and, hence, the likelihood of a welfare loss from RTAs -is weaker the more remote the integrating countries are from the rest of the world (ROW), whilst trade creation should be greater for geographically proximate partners. Similar effects of economic geography factors on welfare are identified in recent work on RTAs with multinational firms (see Ludema, 2002) . As pointed out by Bhagwati (1993) and Krishna (2003) , the theoretical insight that proximity between trading partners renders positive welfare effects of RTA-formation more likely itself builds upon two (Krishna, 2003, pp. 203-204 (Krueger, 1999, p. 116) .
Third, if intra-industry trade is important, country size becomes a key determinant of the welfare effects. Positive effects are more likely the larger and more similar the integrating countries are in their economic sizes, while negative welfare effects are possible if the size of the ROW is significant (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) . Furthermore, relative factor endowments are then less important or may even exhibit different effects as in the HeckscherOhlin model (Levy, 1997) .
We will follow the literature by associating higher positive welfare effects with a higher likelihood of a country participating in an RTA. In these circumstances, theoretical work indicates that RTA membership is determined by the same fundamentals as trade volumes.
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This has two consequences for our empirical analysis. First, there is self-selection into RTAs, which needs to be accounted for to obtain unbiased estimates of RTA effects on trade. This problem has not been addressed in studies on the RTA-induced effects on trade volumes until recently, when the problem of endogenous selection into RTAs has been recognized in the literature on bilateral trade volumes Bergstrand, 2002, 2006; Magee, 2003) .
2 Second, since RTAs and trade are co-determined by the same exogenous observables, this limits the range of available econometric techniques for empirical analysis (Baier and Bergstrand, 2006) . This paper contributes to the empirical literature on RTA effects in the following ways. First, it investigates trade structure effects, which have not so far been on the research agenda.
Second, it uses a different econometric method, namely matching, to account for endogeneity.
As noted above, general equilibrium theory indicates that RTAs and trade are co-determined by the same exogenous variables, which renders standard instrumental variable procedures problematic. For instance, Baier and Bergstrand (2006, p. 14) (Markusen, 1995 (Markusen, , 2002 , they play a far less prominent role in the RTA literature, with Ludema (2002) being a notable exception. 3 We account for the possible role of multinationals in two ways. On the one hand, foreign investment costs affect the self-selection into RTA membership together with the other fundamentals. On the other hand, profit repatriation can lead to unbalanced goods trade, which warrants the use of a trade imbalanceadjusted index of intra-industry trade. 4 To see this, consider the original Grubel-Lloyd (1971 , 1975 ) index on intra-industry trade share, which can be formulated as follows, 2 As pointed out by Baier and Bergstrand (2006) , neglecting the endogeneity of RTA formation has severe consequences and leads to a substantial downward bias of the trade flows effect by a factor of five.
3 This is the more surprising as the literature on multinationals identifies "tariff-jumping" as an important motive for foreign direct investment (see Smith, 1987; Motta, 1992) . 4 See Bergstrand (1983) for an early contribution.
where i and j are country indices and k refers to industries. Now consider a simple one-good model, where goods trade is balanced by repatriated profits of foreign subsidiaries. Then, the Grubel-Lloyd index (GLI) in (1) deviates from unity although all goods trade occurs within the same industry. Following Grubel and Lloyd (1971) and Egger, Egger, and Greenaway (2004) we can adjust this index for trade imbalances to obtain an unbiased measure of intraindustry trade in the presence of multinational firms:
which is not affected by a trade-imbalance bias, i.e., it gives a value of unity in our example with a single good.
Data and Empirical Methodology
In this section we introduce our database, describe the econometric techniques available to avoid a self-selection bias, and discuss the empirical approach we use to estimate the impact of endogenous RTAs on the intra-industry trade share.
Data
Our empirical analysis focuses on the role of new RTA membership for bilateral intra- 1977, 1981, 1986, 1989, 1994 , and 1995 on GLI (CGLI) by controlling for self-selection into RTAs. Note that in our data-set there was no exit from
RTAs. Therefore, we can think of the selection model as a cross-section of new RTA membership events. We include time dummies for all but one of the six years. In a second step, we construct differences in bilateral Grubel-Lloyd indices (DCGLI for the corrected and DGLI for the uncorrected index) over the periods 1976-1977, 1980-1981, 1985-1986, 1988-1989, 1993-1994, and 1994-1995. > Table 2 < Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in the selection model.
In general, we rely on lagged levels that are assumed predetermined to explain new RTA membership. The basic variables (GLI, GDP, L, H, K, TC, IC, Dut) and their sources are listed in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Self-Selection into RTA Membership: Problems and Cures
Existing general equilibrium models of trade are explicit about the endogenous formation of RTAs (see Section 2 and Baier and Bergstrand, 2004 , for an overview). One observation from this line of research is that market size, factor endowments, and transport costs determine the associated welfare effects and, hence, the "likelihood" of RTA membership. In the presence of multinational firms, investment costs may also be important for endogenous membership in
RTAs. This implies that the same economic fundamentals that determine trade volumes and trade structure at the bilateral level also determine the likelihood of RTA membership. Wooldridge, 2002, p. 637f.) . If there is self-selection into new RTA membership, this is not the case any more. Then, we have to explicitly account for self-selection to retrieve unbiased estimates of the RTA effect.
Most of the available techniques to do so are rooted in the program evaluation literature.
Empirical work on international trade has applied some of the available techniques to overcome the bias from self-selection. For instance, Magee (2003) Before we proceed with the application, we provide a brief outline of the general problem of self-selection and its possible cures.
Cures for Self-Selection:
There are three lines of research on how to overcome self-selection bias affecting estimates of treatment effects on some outcome variable. These are (i) matching techniques based on metrics such as the propensity score to construct a valid control group (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 , 1984 , Imbens, 2004 , Abadie, 2005 , (ii) control function procedures, where socalled inverse Mills' ratios (one or more) based on the predictions of the selection equation are used in the outcome model to eliminate the bias (see Heckman, 1978 , Wooldridge, 2002 , or (iii) just-identified instrumental variable procedures that use the estimated selection probabilities as an instrument (see Wooldridge, 2002) . Note that both matching and control functions assume ignorability of treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) or conditional mean independence (Wooldridge, 2002) . In informal accounts we might say that any possible correlation between the outcome (intra-industry trade share changes) of the treated and the untreated can then be eliminated by conditioning on a vector of observable variables. This is why several authors have labelled related procedures as ones of selection on observables (Heckman and Robb, 1985; Moffitt, 1996) .
The Instrumental Variables Approach and Its Assumptions:
Instrumental variable procedures apply relatively strong assumptions about functional form, and typically assume the existence of identifying instruments that are correlated with the selection indicator but not directly with the outcome. It is especially the latter assumption that seems violated from a general equilibrium point of view, where all exogenous variables jointly determine both trade structure and volume and the likelihood of RTA membership. We share this view with Baier and Bergstrand (2006, p. 14) 
The Control Function Approach and Its Assumptions:
An important assumption for control function procedures to hold is additive separability of the treatment effect and the control function (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 612) . Also, control functions naturally provide estimates of the average treatment effect (ATE; i.e., the expected impact of new RTA membership on intra-industry trade shares of a randomly drawn countrypair in the sample; irrespective of whether it actually entered an RTA or not) but not of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT; i.e., the expected RTA effect on the intraindustry trade share of a country-pair randomly drawn from the group of pairs that actually entered an RTA). In contrast to previous research on empirical trade effects of RTA membership (Magee, 2003; Baier and Bergstrand, 2006) , we confine ourselves to mainly estimating ATT (rather than ATE). Hence, we primarily consider RTA effects on new members. In contrast to ATT, ATE does not condition on actual entry into an RTA. But rather, is a weighted average of ATT and the average treatment effect of the untreated (ATU;
i.e., the estimated impact of a hypothetical new RTA membership on the untreated units).
The Matching Approach and Its Assumptions:
An essential assumption for matching procedures that are based on the propensity score (i.e., the non-linear prediction of the selection equation regarding the probability to be treated) is that the propensity score is smaller than unity throughout. In empirical applications this will commonly lead to a loss of those observations that are treated with certainty. Hence, there is a trade-off between goodness of fit in the selection model and the size of the number of usable observations with support. Note that it is impractical to directly match on many explanatory variables due to the "curse of dimensionality". Therefore, similarity is defined according to some metric that maps the vector of observables into a univariate measure. However, even within the support region, a large number of covariates is problematic, since matching estimators include a bias term of stochastic order N -1/k with N being the number of observations and k denoting the number of covariates. In small samples, the associated bias can be substantial (see Frölich, 2004) . To overcome this problem, Abadie and Imbens (2006) suggest a bias-correction that renders the matching estimator N 1/2 -consistent and asymptotically normal. Given this, the difference-in-difference treatment effect of, e.g., RTA membership on the Grubel-Lloyd index can be estimated by comparing the differential change in the Grubel-Lloyd index between the treatment group and the properly constructed control group according to the metric used for matching.
The most commonly used, unit-free metrics for matching are the Mahalanobis distance metric (Cochran and Rubin, 1973 , Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985 , Rosenbaum, 1995 and the propensity score metric (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984) . The former weights each coordinate of the matrix of covariates proportionately by the inverse variance of that variable;
with the latter treatment selection is specified by either a logit or probit model, starting with a latent variable model of the form
x where e is a continuously distributed error term symmetric about zero and independent of x, the vector of explanatory variables (the "observables"). The probability model to be estimated can be written as .
We employ both probit and logit models to estimate the parameter vector β . These provide us with estimates of the propensity score p(x). In our case, the latter is to be interpreted as the likelihood of entering an RTA, conditional on the observables. Note that any univariate metric will only establish a useful measure of similarity, if the treated units (new RTA members) and the control units (the comparable subgroup of non-members) are similar with respect to every observable determining the metric. In the matching literature, this is sometimes referred to as the "balancing property". Otherwise, classifying some control country-pair as being similar to a treated one according to the chosen metric can be misleading. To avoid the associated bias, Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) suggest, in the second step, conditioning on those observables for which the balancing property is violated. 7 In our case, the balancing property is not violated according to t-tests as can be seen from Table A2 . Hence, this concern should be of minor importance but we can still eliminate any remaining differences by conditioning on the observables.
The vector of estimated propensity scores is used to construct an appropriate control group of non-RTA-member country-pairs with a similar probability of new RTA membership as the actual new RTA members. A single or several similar untreated country-pairs can be matched to each new RTA member. The number of matched control units is either exogenously imposed (in k-nearest neighbour matching estimators such as one-to-one matching) or a critical interval is determined with all untreated countries in the corresponding region around a treated observation's propensity score selected in the control group. Some estimators even use a large amount or all untreated units as controls with their weight declining in the absolute difference to a treated unit's propensity score.
ATT with one-to-one matching is equivalent to running a weighted least squares regression of DCGLI and DGLI on RTA where a frequency weight is assigned to all treated (each of them gets weight one) and control units (a control unit gets a weight corresponding to the number of treated units it was matched onto) and zero to all other untreated observations. Hence, there are as many control observations as treated ones. This may involve a dramatic decline in the number of observations to estimate ATT. Accordingly the quality of one-to-one matching comes at the cost of a loss in efficiency. This shortcoming is overcome by matching more than just one -e.g., five -nearest neighbours to each treated country-pair by assigning the same weight to each of these k-nearest untreated observations regardless of how close they are in terms of their propensity score. This can be further improved by determining a radius around each treated country pair's propensity score. In our case, we choose a radius of 0.1 12 (i.e., ten percentage points of the likelihood of becoming a new RTA member); within that untreated pairs would be selected into the control group. This implies an endogenous number of matched controls for each treated unit. Accordingly, the treated will differ in terms of the number of matched controls.
Finally, kernel density matching assigns weights that decline in the propensity score difference of the target country-pair to the controls. In large samples, one-to-one matching, knearest neighbour matching, radius matching and kernel matching are consistent, since the local neighbourhood of the propensity score for a target country-pair declines with sample size (see Frölich, 2004) . In small samples, the efficiency loss with one-to-one matching or the bias from less exact matching can be serious. Table 3 summarizes the results of various probit model specifications for new RTA membership. In Probits 1-5, we use a common trend and in 6-10 we include time dummies.
Estimating Self-Selection into New RTA Membership
8 Probits 1 and 6 use size variables of the same functional form as Helpman (1987) , who estimates the determinants of trade structure. Similarity of country size is measured by the similarity of bilateral GDP. This has a positive sign in all specifications, which is in line with theory, pointing to a higher likelihood of RTA membership for similarly sized economies (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2004, p. 47 ).
> Table 3 <
In Probits 2-5 and 7-10, we employ similarity indices of all three factors. The literature is not conclusive about the nexus between relative factor endowment differences and likelihood of RTA membership (see Section 2). In our empirical application, the coefficient of low-skilled labour is significantly positive, that of human capital is insignificant, and that of physical capital significantly negative. Note that human capital might enter insignificantly due to its 13 8 We also could have used logit models instead of probits to estimate the propensity score. Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) suggest to test probit and logit against each other based on a likelihood ratio test. According to the test statistics summarized in Table 3 , Logits 1 and 2 are rejected against their probit counterparts. The other logits perform at least as well as their probit counterparts (results are available from the authors upon request). In the sensitivity analysis below we illustrate that the logit and the probit models result in very similar estimates of the endogenous RTA effect on intra-industry trade.
high correlation with physical capital. 9 Alternatively, in Probits 1 and 6 we have deployed a specification using absolute differences in skilled-to-unskilled labour endowments and in capital-to-unskilled labour endowments instead of each factor endowment separately. Then the coefficient of the former is significantly negative and that of the latter is insignificantly positive (similar to the capital-labour coefficient in Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) . However, this result does not provide support for Krueger's (1999, p. 116) hypothesis that an RTA "between a developed and a developing country is more likely to improve welfare", as our country sample mainly covers OECD members.
The bilateral trade cost variable tends to have a negative impact on the probability of joining an RTA (see Probit 1-4 and 6-9). This result is consistent with the argument in Ludema (2002, p. 336 ) that "geographical proximity facilitates trade policy coordination". However, when accounting for interaction terms between endowment variables and bilateral transport costs, the latter effect becomes insignificant (see Probit 5 and Probit 10).
To account for the role of multinational firms, we include investment cost variables. In particular, we employ the average size of and absolute difference in bilateral investment costs as well as an interaction term between low-skilled labour endowment similarity and the investment cost ratio as determinants of new RTA membership. Use of these variables can be motivated by a model with horizontal multinationals and trade in the longer version of this paper (Egger, Egger, and Greenaway, 2005) . The empirical results indicate that all three variables enter significantly, and their coefficients are positive.
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Finally, we included duties as a separate control variable. Countries with high tariffs in the initial situation either lose a lot of tariff income from entering an RTA or they incur substantial market pressure from foreign firms entering their market. A negative sign of the respective coefficients may be an indicator that higher initial duties are associated with a negative attitude towards bilateral trade liberalisation. This aspect has so far not been emphasized in empirical work on endogenous RTAs. However, our finding lends support to the so-called Natural Trading Partner Hypothesis, which states that RTAs are "more likely if countries already have significant bilateral trade" (Magee, 2003, p. 3).
Since Probit 9 performs best in terms of explanatory power, it is a natural candidate to rely on for matching. 11 MacFadden's Pseudo R 2 indicates that the explanatory power of the model is high. In addition, we note that the null hypothesis of the similarity of the samples of the treated and control observations with respect to the separate controls is not rejected (see Table   A2 in the Appendix). Hence, there is no indication of a violation of the balancing property which suggests that the propensity score metric is an unbiased measure of the similarity between the treated and control units.
5 Effect of RTA Membership on the Intra-Industry Trade Share Table 4 summarizes the findings of descriptive comparison estimates and several matching estimates of ATT. To ensure that the estimated RTA effect does not pick up any bias associated with violation of the balancing property or the omission of relevant determinants of the intra-industry trade share, we additionally control for the observables in the treatment effect regressions following Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) . The descriptive comparison is simply an OLS regression of DCGLI and DGLI on RTA. The first two matching estimates -a one-to-one matching and a five-nearest neighbour matching -rely on the Mahalanobis distance metric. These are bias-corrected as suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2006) . The others are based on the propensity score: one-to-one matching, five-nearest neighbour matching, radius matching, and kernel matching.
> Table 4 <
We apply each matching approach and, additionally, the descriptive comparison as the benchmark estimator to two different concepts of the intra-industry trade share index. These are the index corrected for multilaterally imbalanced trade due to the activity of MNEs (Egger, Egger, and Greenaway, 2004 ) and the uncorrected Grubel-Lloyd index.
The findings can be summarized as follows. First, for our difference-in-difference analysis it seems of minor importance whether the corrected or uncorrected index is used. The reason for this is that the average annual change in CGLI is small as it is for multilateral trade imbalances. Second, the descriptive comparison estimates that ignore selection on observables point to a positive impact on the intra-industry trade share of about 0.6 to 0.8 percentage points which is not significantly different from zero. Third, ignoring self-selection into RTA membership leads to a downward-biased estimate of the impact on either index. Depending on the matching estimator, this downward bias is estimated at between 62 percent (propensity-score-based one-to-one matching) and 86 percent (bias-adjusted one-to-one matching).
Since the number of covariates is relatively large, this could affect the quality of the propensity score estimates. Hence, the bias-adjusted Mahalanobis metric-based estimates might be more trustworthy. The impact of new RTA membership seems quantitatively important and amounts to almost 40 percent (bias-adjusted one-to-one matching) of the average level of the corrected index in the sample. This is also remarkable as we know from 
Robustness of the RTA Effect on Intra-Industry Trade Shares
We assess robustness in various ways. First, with respect to (i) the omission of bilateral economic variables, (ii) the use of logit models instead of their probit counterparts to illustrate that the treatment effects are insensitive in this regard, and (iii) block matching as an alternative to the methods used in the previous subsection. Table 5 investigates these when using the change in the trade-imbalance-corrected index (DCGLI) as the outcome variable.
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Second, we study the relevance of omission of potentially relevant political variables. Third, we consider the role of interdependence of the country-pairs with respect to observable characteristics. Fourth, we compare the ATT with the ATE. Fifth, we allow the ATT to vary across country-pairs depending on the included observable characteristics. Finally, we assess the impact of a new RTA membership on intra-industry trade for each 2-digit SITC category separately.
Specification of the Selection Equation I (Omission of Relevant Bilateral Economic Variables, Logit vs. Probit, and Block Matching)
The ATT estimates in Table 4 are very robust to alternative model specifications regarding the coverage of economic determinants as in Table 3 . This is indicated by the respective estimates for Logits 9 and 10 in Table 5 . ATT is much lower only if relevant economic observables are not controlled for in the case of one-to-one matching (for instance, when using the excessively parsimonious binary choice selection Models 6 and 7 in Table 3 ).
Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
17 12 We only report the results for Models 9 and 10 since the others are rejected against these alternatives. The corresponding results for the uncorrected DGLI are very similar and available from the authors upon request.
> Table 5 <
Using logit instead of probit models has no influence on the treatment effects. This can be seen by comparing the different estimates for Logit 9 in Table 5 with their respective counterparts in the first column of Table 3 . Finally, using block matching instead of nearestneighbour, radius, or kernel matching, yields very similar results as other matching estimators. This can bee seen from a comparison of the results at the bottom of Table 5 with the remaining ones.
Based on the levels of log-likelihood and corresponding likelihood ratio tests, Logit 9 is preferable to the estimated alternatives (probits and logits). Due to the possible relevance of a bias-correction in our sample, the Mahalanobis-metric-based one-to-one estimator in the spirit of Abadie and Imbens (2006) might be most reliable among those applied in our case. The results based on the propensity score metric form a lower bound among the considered estimates.
Specification of the Selection Equation II (Omission of Relevant Political

Variables)
We estimated models which included potentially important political variables in the last but one column of Table 5 . For instance, Magee (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2004) indicate that political and political-economy variables could be important for RTA formation. Our variables reflect the similarity in the political system in two economies, the maximum/minimum number of years that the leading party had been in power, the political orientation (right-wing versus left-wing) of the leading party, the durability of two countries' political systems since the last regime change -an index of political stability, the fractionalization of the legislature, checks and balances in two economies, and an indicator of maximum polarization between the executive party and the four principle parties of the legislature. These data are available at an annual basis from The World Bank Walsh, 2001, 2004) and from the Polity IV Project data-set (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) . The Appendix provides further details. In general, the use of these variables can be motivated from both the political science literature and a political economy point of view.
First of all, it seems reasonable to assume two governments with the same political system or orientation to exhibit a higher likelihood of implementing a trade agreement (see Gowa and Mansfield, 1993 , for the role of political-military alliances for free-trade coalitions). We find support for this view in our selection models reported in Table A3 in the Appendix (e.g., note the positive impact of a left-wing government if the other country is left-wing, too; and similarly for right-wing governments). This result is also in line with the empirical finding of Magee (2003) that preferential trade agreements are more likely between two democracies.
Second, previous research on RTA membership has emphasized the role of lobbying for trade protection (Grossman and Helpman, 1995, Ornelas, 2005) . All else equal, lobbying should be more successful (and, thus, more likely), the lower the degree of fractionalization in the legislature and the lower the degree of checks and balances. This hypothesis finds some support in our data-set. Furthermore, we find that a longer period in office tends to reduce the likelihood of RTA formation. An intuition for this result may be that lobbying takes some time before it becomes effective. A lower degree of polarization can also be associated with more lobbying. Hence, the significantly negative coefficients of this variable are difficult to interpret against the background of the lobbying literature. Finally, we find that less durable political systems are more likely to liberalize trade in our sample of country-pairs and years.
One of the reasons for this might be that more durable economies have liberalized trade in earlier periods. An alternative explanation may be that durable political systems are more vulnerable to lobbying for trade protection.
Since political variables are significant determinants of self-selection into RTAs, it is of interest to what extent their inclusion affects the ATT estimates of new RTA membership on intra-industry trade shares. As can be seen from the column labelled as "Logit a)
" in Table 5 , it turns out that the difference between the original estimates and the ones based on the political variable augmented selection model is rather small, in particular if the propensity score metric is applied. One major reason for this might be seen in the correlation between the political and the trade and investment cost variables. Hence, the relationship in the propensity scores among country-pairs is largely unaffected, leading only to a small change in the effect on intra-industry trade shares.
Specification of the Selection Equation III (Omitted Interdependence)
In the previous analysis, we assumed that new RTA membership only depends on bilateral determinants. In a multilateral world, we would expect that third-country variables influence both a new RTA membership as well as the bilateral intra-industry trade share (see also Baier and Bergstrand, 2004 , for such an argument). To take this issue into account, we constructed GDP-weighted third-market observables for each country-pair. This assumes that the interdependence of country-pairs is positively related to market size. Accounting for thirdcountry variables (the weighted market size, factor endowments, trade costs, etc.) increases the set of explanatory variables substantially, but the probit and logit models can still be estimated. They are summarized in the columns "Probit c)
" and "Logit c)
" in Table A3 of the Appendix.
The associated ATT estimates for the preferred Logit model are given in the column labelled
" in Table 5 . First of all, it should be noted that with the large number of explanatory variables at hand, the likelihood of a bias in simple matching models increases. Hence, we should think of the Abadie and Imbens (2006) bias-corrected estimates as the most reliable ones (see the top rows in Table 5 ). The one-to-one bias-adjusted matching estimate is somewhat lower than the baseline estimate in Logit 9. Also the propensity score based matching estimates are somewhat lower than the ones in Logit 9. It should be noted that we control for the observables in addition to new RTA membership in the regression approach.
Hence, the GDP-weighted third-country variables contribute to the change in the GrubelLloyd index on their own. Overall, we may conclude that accounting for the market-sizerelated interdependence of country-pairs does not affect our qualitative results.
Estimation of Average Treatment Effects (ATE)
Is the treatment effect of the untreated (ATU) -i.e., the RTA effect that would arise from a hypothetical membership of the actual non-members on their intra-industry trade sharesdifferent from ATT? This can be implicitly answered by looking at the resulting average treatment effect (ATE), which is a weighted average of ATT and ATU. The results for the preferred, bias-adjusted, nearest neighbour matching estimators can be summarized as follows. Irrespective of whether we apply nearest or five-nearest neighbour matching, ATE is bigger than ATT, hence, ATU is bigger than ATT. The estimates are higher than the ATT effects, irrespective of whether the change in the corrected (DCGLI) or the uncorrected (DGLI) index is considered. This indicates that country-pairs with an annual growth in CGLI that is below the average (and also GLI) are more likely to select into RTA membership than other country-pairs. However, the main result of downward-biased RTA effects on intraindustry trade shares from ignoring selection on observables extends to ATE. For ATE an even bigger downward bias is detected than for ATT. The respecitve ATE estimates are available from the authors upon request.
Heterogeneous Average Treatment Effects of the Treated (ATT) Across
Country-Pairs
So far, we assumed that the treatment effect of the treated is symmetric across country-pairs.
While it is common to adopt this assumption in empirical work, it is not necessary to do so. In fact, we might assume that the treatment effect of the treated varies itself with the observables rather than exerting a linear impact. For instance, Wooldridge (2002, p. 613 ) discusses such an estimation procedure in a control function approach. However, it is possible to adopt a similar assumption with propensity-score-based matching, too. The results are summarized in Table 6 . > Table 6 < Since there are numerous interaction terms, we report some of the moments (mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum) at the bottom of the table. In general, the parameter estimates point in the direction that the treatment effect of the treated declines with bilateral country size, similarity in bilateral unskilled labour endowments and the level of bilateral trade costs, and it increases with similarity in bilateral capital endowment and bilateral investment costs. The means of the propensity-score-based ATT estimates are slightly smaller than the original ones (see Table 4 ). The median effect is somewhat higher than the mean, and the standard deviation is quite large. For some countries, the change in DGLI (or GLI) might be even lower as a response to new RTA membership (this will be the case for large country pairs where unskilled labour endowment differences are relatively high and bilateral trade impediments are significant). This is illustrated by the minimum effect amounting to about -0.14 (for one-to-one matching). Not surprisingly, the maximum impact is quite large with an estimated effect of about 0.10. These findings are very robust across matching procedures.
Average Treatment Effects of the Treated (ATT) for Separate Goods Categories
In the previous analysis, we focused on the treatment effect of new RTA membership on a country-pair's overall share in intra-industry trade. Here, we ask which industries (or commodity categories) contribute the lion's share. Our findings are summarized in Table 7 .
> Table 7 < There, we estimate ATT based on one-to-one propensity score matching for each SITC twodigit industry and we report the one digit industry-specific simple average below the two-digit results. One general observation from this exercise is that in broad terms the impact of RTAs on the intra-industry trade share tends to be lower for homogeneous industries (see the first column block of results in the table) than for differentiated ones (see the second column block of results in the table). Only the mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials category seems to be an outlier in this respect.
Recent theoretical work points out that a non-trivial share of trade volumes is due to the increasing fragmentation of production across borders (Yi, 2003) . To some extent, this could happen even within narrowly defined industries (recall that we compute intra-industry trade shares at the 4-digit level). Then, our finding could imply that RTAs stimulate intra-industry trade not only in final but also in intermediate goods (the latter would be consistent also with the model of Ethier, 1982) . Although this cannot be viewed as a formal test of the argument, at the very least, the industries in categories 6, 7 and 8 are ones where we would expect trade in differentiated intermediate goods to be important.
Conclusions
A great deal of progress has been made in recent years in the empirical analysis of the impact This paper sheds light on the impact of endogenous RTA membership on intra-industry trade shares mainly within the OECD since 1970. Most importantly, we detect a positive treatment effect on intra-industry trade shares induced by a new RTA membership, which amounts to about four per cent for our preferred estimates. This is sizable when taking into acount that the four-digit based average of intra-industry trade shares amounts to about eleven per cent on average in the economies in our sample. In general, we conclude from this that the previously identified RTA-induced increase in trade volumes can be mainly attributed to an associated growth in intra-industry trade, at least in the developed economies.
Besides economic determinants of self-selection into RTA membership, which have been put forward by previous theoretical and empirical work, we have also controlled for the influence of political variables. It turns out that political factors are important for RTA membership but that inclusion of these variables does not change the ATT estimates of new RTAs on the intraindustry trade share in an important way. Regarding the sectoral decomposition of the RTA effects, we find that the impact of endogenous new RTA membership on the intra-industry trade share tends to be lower for industries which can be classifed as more or less homogeneous as compared to ones associated with production of differentiated goods.
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• FRAC: This variable indicates the total fractionalization of a country's legislature and it reflects the probability that two random draws would produce legislators from different parties. Again, we construct two variables ("Maximum level of total fractionalization …" and "Minimum level of total fractionalization …" in Table A3 ).
• CHECKS: This variable reflects the number of veto players and therefore indicates the degree of political control.
• POLARIZ: This variable measures the maximum difference of orientation among the parties in government, and it takes on values in between 0 and 2. Similar to the other variables, the maximum and minimum levels at the country-pair level are separately employed.
Data based from Marshall and Jaggers (2002):
The Polity IV Project 2001 reports data for 185 countries from 1800 onwards. We only use a single variable from this source, namely DURABLE which is available from 1949 onwards.
The durability indicator reflects the number of years since the last (greater) regime transition and, hence, it is a measure of a country's political system stability. Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. -a) Logit model includes political variables. -b) Logit model as in a) plus GDPweighted observables of third countries. See Table A3 in the Appendix for details. Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Control variables are included in the second step estimations throughout. 1-digit figures are unweighted averages. Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. -a) Annual data are from The World Bank (Beck, Clarke, Groffe, Keefer, and Walsh, 2004 ). -b) Annual data are from the Polity IV Project data-set (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) . -c) Including GDP-weighted third-country effects. The parameters of the constant, the time dummies, and the (jointly significant) GDP-weighted observables are not reported for space reasons.
